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The trials and tribulations of legal terms today: an affective approach in jurilinguistics

I. Introduction

The title of this paper stems from the observation of the behavior of legal terms through the perspective of languages in contact and that of the penetration of legal borrowings into target-languages. It is also tributary of the affective approach in jurilinguistics that we have been studying for the past three years, and which poses the emotional reaction to the perception of a reality as the origin of legal concepts and terms (Veleanu, 2018, 2019).

Legal terms originate either directly from the legal field, or through the specialization of non-legal words. Both these processes take time, involve linguistic and extra-linguistic factors, and put the candidate words to several tests at the end of which they are - or not - granted access into the target legal language and system. Sometimes, the linguistic and cultural tests turn into trials and tribulations, and the candidate words undergo analyses by legal and linguistic committees, as in the cases of *whistleblower*, *lanceur d'alerte* and *femicide*, *féminicide*. Some other times, because “legal language is not an instrument aimed solely at internal communication within the legal profession” (Mattila, 2006 : 3), they are manipulated, distorted or clarified by the non-initiated (politicians, journalists, etc.), as we will see through the examples of *gevalt*, *penal* and *recomposition*. These actions have an affective background, because our emotions naturally affect us, our interlocutors and the world we share and adapt to continuously, as Christophe Caupenne, former chief negotiator of the elite tactical unit of the French National Police RAID (“Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence”), put it : “C’est normal que les émotions, positives comme négatives, nous envahissent. Elles sont de formidables outils d’adaptation au monde et constituent une richesse pour l’homme. C’est la part d’humanité qu’il nous faut assumer. » (Haag, 2019 : 304)

A trial is, as indicated in its first meaning, an “act or process of testing, a putting to proof by examination, experiment, etc., from Anglo-French *trier* (13c.), from Old French *trier* “to pick out, cull” (12c.), from Gallo-Roman **triare*”¹. The sense of “examining and deciding of the issues between parties in a court of law” was first recorded some four hundred years later, towards the end of the 16th century. We can easily notice the scope of the original signification of the term *trial* today, as the entry of any legal term into a given language is subject to thorough analysis by both linguists and lawyers in countries such as France (the *Commission d'enrichissement de la langue française*, under the authority of the French Prime-Minister and the *Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France* (DGLFLF)²) and Canada (*Translation Bureau*³, *Termium*⁴, *Centre de traduction et de*

¹ <https://www.etymonline.com/word/trial>

² « Le dispositif d'enrichissement de la langue française a pour mission première de créer des termes et expressions nouveaux afin de combler les lacunes de notre vocabulaire et de désigner en français les concepts et réalités qui apparaissent sous des appellations étrangères. Placée sous l'autorité du Premier ministre et coordonnée par la Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France (DGLFLF), la Commission d'enrichissement de la langue française repose sur un réseau de 19 groupes d'experts des domaines scientifiques et techniques répartis dans 13 ministères, et travaille en concertation permanente avec des partenaires institutionnels comme l'Académie des sciences, des universitaires spécialistes de la langue, mais aussi des

terminologie juridiques (CTJ) at the Université de Moncton Faculty of Law, Jacques Picotte's *Juridictionnaire*⁵) where the linguistic questions related to borrowings and neology are regulated by official commissions and bodies appointed to that specific purpose by the authorities.

A tribulation is defined as ““a state of affliction or oppression, suffering, distress”, from Old French *tribulacion* (12c.), from Church Latin *tribulationem*, “distress, trouble, affliction” from the past-participle stem of *tribulare* “to oppress, afflict”, a figurative use by Christian writers of Latin *tribulare* “to press”, “to thresh out grain”, from *tribulum* “threshing sledg”⁶. In a certain way, it is the proof that the “no pain, no gain” saying is imbedded in the collective unconscious and related to the first human occupations and emotional reactions, as pointed out by Emile Benveniste in its *Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*.

The entry of legal terms into other languages may be characterized by emotional reactions from the part of the users, as these terms may cause trouble into the legal and linguistic system of the receiving legal language-culture. As Pruvost and Sablayrolles put it:

« Le néologisme a ses tribunaux où, selon le moment, la fonction, le tempérament et l'humeur des juges, les néologismes sont testés, examinés, discutés ou excommuniés. La presse, les dictionnaires, la littérature, les institutions représentent autant d'instances où la néologie fait intervenir, dans un bouillonnement fructueux pour la langue, autant de sages conseillers que de cassandres et de thuriféraires. » (Pruvost, Sablayrolles, 2019 : 15)

We perceive the world through our senses and their corresponding organs: through our eyes we perceive shapes and colours, through our ears we hear a wide array of sounds, through our nostrils we inhale the odours around us, through our skin we feel different temperatures, textures, resistances. Yet, as we do speak about a sense of justice, what is the organ – etymologically, the instrument filtering the world for us and shaping our perception of it, just as the organ in a cathedral filters the air and shapes the vibrations into the sounds of a, let's say, Bach fugue – that is responsible for our sense of justice? Phenomenologically, and following E. Levinas, how do we perceive justice and its opposite, injustice? What enables us to express such a dichotomic apprehension of reality? And how does this awareness, specific to human beings, appear and evolve? To start answering these questions, one must first attempt to define justice, that is find its limits, touch its boundaries and explore the contours of the human being both as an individual and as a member of a group, shaped tridimensionally⁷ by his need for signification (P. Ricoeur)⁸: of the world, or sacredness, of himself as part of a community, or belonging, and of himself as a difference, or individual identity.

membres d'organismes de normalisation (AFNOR) et des responsables de la politique linguistique des pays francophones. Une fois validés par l'Académie française, les termes sont publiés au Journal officiel de la République française ; ils sont d'usage obligatoire dans les administrations et les établissements de l'État et servent de référence, en particulier pour les traducteurs et les rédacteurs techniques. », <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/Thematiques/Langue-francaise-et-langues-de-France/Politiques-de-la-langue/Enrichissement-de-la-langue-francaise/Le-dispositif>

³ <https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/bt-tb/index-eng.html>

⁴ <http://www.btb.termiumplus.gc.ca/tpv2alpha/alpha-eng.html?lang=eng&index=alt>

⁵ PICOTTE, Jacques, *Juridictionnaire. Recueil des difficultés et des ressources du français juridique*, Centre de traduction et de terminologie juridiques, Faculté de droit, Université de Moncton, actualisé au 15 octobre 2015, <http://www.ctj.ca/documents/juridictionnaire.pdf>

⁶ <https://www.etymonline.com/word/tribulation>

⁷ Rav Kook cité par M.-R. Guedj: « toutes les grandes civilisations sont traversées par trois courants: le courant du sacré, le courant de la nation et le courant de l'universel. », <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/talmudiques/la-crise-de-luniversel-12-les-droits-de-lhomme-en-question>

⁸ Paul Ricoeur cité par M.-A. Ouaknin: « nous découvrons que ce dont manque le plus les hommes, c'est de justice certes, d'amour sûrement, mais plus encore de signification. », <https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/talmudiques/la-crise-de-luniversel-22-le-sens-le-monde-et-la-personne>

For the Judeo-Christian civilization, the first attempt to make sense of the world is recorded in the Bible, where the Genesis does not only represent a first description of the creation of the world but also of justice, as A. Dershowitz argued in its book *The Genesis of Justice*. The need to understand and thus control and master the world found its expression in religious texts and commandments. To the individual in search of his own signification, S. Freud offered answers such as the life and death drives. For the *homo socialis* in need to belong and define himself as part of a group, both Freud in his study on the importance of the totem and the taboo, and Dershowitz in his secular theory of the origins of rights coming from wrongs, provided possible answers. To all of these three quests, the affective neurosciences of our modern world bring their invaluable support in posing emotions as the foundations of human behavior, and thus, of our life together and our survival, individually and collectively. Understanding is rooted in feeling and, as Fernando Pessoa put it, “any word contains an idea and an emotion”. P. Ekman identified basic universal emotions which are “valid for all cultures and part of our biological inheritance” (Ekman 1999), M.H. Immordino-Yang endeavored to “uncover relationships between reasoning, feelings, and meaning making, on one hand, and neurobiological mechanisms, on the other.” (Immordino-Yang 2013: 42) and J. Panksepp demonstrated that our cognitive capacity is determined by our affective response to external and internal stimuli:

“capacities for thoughtful reflection emerge gradually in higher brain regions developmentally and epigenetically. In this hierarchical vision of self-awareness based on primal mental processes, one progresses from ‘cogito ergo sum’ (a top-down RAM inspired vision) to ‘I feel therefore I am’ (a bottom-up ROM inspired vision), and with experience-dependent cortical programming to ‘I feel, therefore I think’.” (Panksepp et al. 2012: 8)

The law, being founded on the use of a specific language, exhibits inherent difficulties and ambiguities when it comes to its interpretation according to given time periods and places (Gémar, 2015: 479) Interpretation being at the chore of any act of legal communication, one cannot but acknowledge with A. Dershowitz the approach suggested by the Bible commentator Rabbi Eliezer Ashkenazi in the 16th century : “you must investigate and interpret, because for this purpose you were created” (Dershowitz, 2000: 19) Making sense of the world through language is vital for the human being and it involves intellectual curiosity while the organization of the gathered information into norms and patterns is a reflection of our neurological structure: “Biologically, our nervous systems are organized in such a way that the brain automatically clusters incoming stimuli into configurations.” (Yalom, 1989: 12) With countless years of experience in the apprehension of the world as hunters and gatherers, our brains still perceive the world following these ancient occupational and survival patterns strongly anchored in affect:

“The human brain is a product of millions of years of evolution and we are hard-wired with instincts that helped our ancestors to survive in small groups of hunters and gatherers. Our brains often jump to swift conclusions without much thinking, which used to help us avoid immediate dangers. We are interested in gossip and dramatic stories, which used to be the only source of news and useful information. [...] We have many instincts that used to be useful thousands of years ago, but we live in a very different world now.” (Rosling, 2019: 15) From ancient times, emotion, language and the law have coexisted, influencing each other and shaping our perception and representation of the world: “Le halo affectif des mots est déjà une interprétation du monde” (Cyrulnik, 8: 2019). Emotion and laws have coexisted, and expressions from different legal languages-cultures bear witness to this reality.

II. Examples

1) Translations on trial: *whistleblower*, *femicide*

1.1) *Whistleblower*

Contrastive jurilinguistics sheds more light on the neologization process while the latter reveals the evolution of legal systems and societies. The example of an American legal term which has recently entered the French legal language says a lot about the differences between the American and the French legal systems and the emotional reactions caused by its French equivalents. As legal terms may be tried by both legal and non-legal professionals, the case of the culture-bound term *whistleblower* whose translation had been largely debated for years by French politicians, journalists, sociologists, lawyers, etc., before actually being officially translated into French as *lanceur d'alerte* in June 2016, when it became a legal concept under French law (Veleanu, 2018), points at the importance of extra-linguistic factors in the process of translating and introducing a new legal term and concept into a target-language. Terms such as *informateur*, *délateur*, *dénonciateur* provoked strong emotional reactions related to the French history of the Second World War, and thus the preferred translation was a historically-neutral one, whereas in Canada, where the emotional impact of the memory of the collaboration with the Nazis is less strong than in Europe, the Government of Canada's terminology and linguistic data bank Termium+ records *dénonciateur* as the official translation. In this context, the cultural neutralisation of the exported culture-bound terms may be questioned, and neologisms are construed under the cognitive perspective of the apprehension of the world while being the trigger of a comprehension process as they connect a new understanding to an older one (Humbley, 2006: 28)

1.2) *Féminicide*

Legal terms may stand trial in front of assemblies of legal professionals and not be granted the green light, as in the example of the term *femicide* whose translation and official implementation into the French legal language was contemplated by the French *Assemblée nationale* in June 2016⁹, only to decide that the French criminal code was sufficient and that the reality of the French society did not justify the borrowing of this legal concept used in South America, Canada, Spain and Italy, and already an international norm¹⁰. The French *Commission générale de terminologie et de néologie* advised on the official use of the French translation of *femicide*, which is *féminicide*, but its opinion did not modify the French law. Coined by Jill Radford and Diane Russell in their book *Femicide : the politics of woman killing*, the term, which is built on the contraction of the common nouns *female* and *homicide*, gained popularity in the 1990s under the Spanish translation and adaptation *feminicidio* by the anthropologist Marcela Lagarde y de Los Ríos from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México who used it to describe the murders of women in Ciudad Juárez (Veleanu, Bittencourt, 2017: 276). It has been used under its French adaptation on the Spanish pattern at the Council of Europe and at the United Nations since 2005 and entered *Le Petit Robert* in 2015 as *féminicide*. The legal definition of *féminicide* in French was perceived as a legal pitfall («Mme Élisabeth Moiron-Braud. La caractérisation du féminicide constitue un écueil juridique » Corzon, 2016: 63), and a semantic difference was pinpointed between the terms

⁹« Faut-il reconnaître en droit le « féminicide » ou au moins développer l'usage de ce terme pour rendre plus visibles les violences de genre ? [...] Au vu de ces évolutions, est-il opportun aujourd'hui de modifier le code pénal français et d'y introduire le féminicide ou prévoir des circonstances aggravantes pour les meurtres commis « à raison du sexe » ? » (Corzon, 2016 : 6)

¹⁰ World Health Organization, Pan American Health Organization, *Le fémicide. Comprendre et lutter contre la violence à l'égard des femmes*, 2012.

authors and *aggressors*, as the former is also used in other fields of activity, such as that of literary works (« Concernant les auteurs de faits de violence, la sémantique est importante. Aussi les nommons-nous « agresseurs », car il s’agit de personnes qui agressent et non pas d’« auteurs » comme ceux d’œuvres littéraires. » Corzon, 2016 : 64). Borrowing *femicide* into legal French and transforming it into *féminicide* as a French legal concept by altering the French criminal code was not deemed necessary. Nonetheless, the term was accepted and adopted by several “emotional communities”¹¹ in France and it entered the French everyday language as well as the fields of NGOs and international and humanitarian relations and law, enriching the French language and culture with a new word and a new reality. The mere presence of a neologism reflects the evolution of a language and that of the society using it, while the debates around the transformation of a non-legal term into a legal one usually precede the evolution of the legal language in question. Time is of the essence in linguistic matters regarding lexical changes, and time will tell whether or not the term and concept of *féminicide* will become part of the French legal system, although one cannot but hope that the French society will not regress as regards the rights of women and become a patriarchal society characterized by machismo. Recently there has been vivid emotion in the French mass-media, where the absence of the legal concept and term *féminicide* is less deplored than the enforcement of the existing laws protecting women¹². The cultural factor is important in the implementation of a new legal term such as *femicide* into a new language-culture, and the sociologist Marisa Sanematsu highlights the fact that this term represents « uma morte característica dos países latinos, marcados por sociedades histórica e culturalmente machistas e patriarcais. »¹³ In today’s reticular and connected world blessed with the freedom of the press and constantly improving technology, mass media overdramatize in order to sell more and permanently alert us to negative events happening at the moment of speaking. Because of our increased monitoring capacity in many fields, we are able to focus on more phenomena than before, but emotionally-wise we obtain an increase in the level of anxiety within society, as they become more visible to us: “This improved reporting is itself a sign of human progress, but it creates the impression of the exact opposite.” (Rosling, 2019: 67) This leads to misperceptions which transform themselves into misconceptions if they are repeated long enough by figures of authority. Using H. Rosling’s comparison between the adjectives “frightening” and “dangerous” (Rosling, 2019: 122), we may say that *féminicide* shifts from a dangerous phenomenon (i.e. posing a real risk) characterizing certain societies into a frightening (i.e. posing a perceived risk) spectacular object (R. Barthes) selected and used by the media because it provokes fear and appeals to our dramatic instinct.

2) *Ungeziefer*¹⁴ or *Froschkönig*¹⁵: the metamorphoses of *gevalt*, *penal(i)*, *recomposition* or *human composting* by non-specialists

2.1) *Gevalt*

Sometimes, thanks to languages in contact, a legal term would evolve into a non-legal one, thus despecializing itself and, provided it becomes part of another field of activity, going

¹¹ Weber, M., *Économie et société*, Plon, Paris, 1971.

¹² « En 2017, 109 femmes sont mortes parce qu’elles étaient des femmes. Le plus souvent sous les coups de leur conjoint ou de leur ex-conjoint. Ce sont des féminicides. C’est comme ça qu’il est défini dans Le Petit Robert depuis 2015. C’est comme ça aussi qu’il est défini dans le droit de plusieurs pays d’Amérique latine. Mais pas en France, où l’on parle toujours d’homicide. », GARRAT-VALCARCEL, Rachel « Le féminicide absent du droit français, juste une question de vocabulaire? », 20Minutes, 14/03/19, <https://www.20minutes.fr/societe/2472955-20190314-feminicide-absent-droit-francais-juste-question-vocabulaire>

¹³ <http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-38183545>

¹⁴ German *ungeheures Ungeziefer*, “monstrous vermin”, in Franz Kafka’s *Die Verwandlung*, *The Metamorphoses*.

¹⁵ *Der Froschkönig oder der eiserne Heinrich*, *The Frog King or The Iron Heinrich*, the Brothers Grimm.

through a process of respecialization. An interesting example of such a term is *gevalt*, a Yiddish noun used in a collocation with the noun “campaign” in the context of the Israeli elections in April 2019¹⁶. *Gevalt* (also written *gevald*) comes from Middle High German *gewalt*, where it meant force, violence, control, power, authority, legally established control. The Yiddish original phrase is אוי געוואלט, *oy gevalt*, “oh, violence!”, a way of signifying shock or amazement¹⁷. It is worth noticing that, from a noun with a legal, military, political meaning expressing domination, *gevalt* entered and adapted its form to Yiddish, another Germanic language, with an exclusively affective signification, keeping the semantic characteristic of force only to express it in highly emotional contexts through the intensity of the act of communicating a cry for help, a shock at anything disastrous, or a strong positive feeling of wonder at anything exceptional. From the Yiddish language, *gevalt* continued its journey into Hebrew where it became known as an epithet in the field of politics and journalism, and more specifically the sub-field of elections, as part of the collocation קמפיין הגעוואלט *campein hagevalt*, and from there into English as *gevalt campaign*, and into French as *tactique du “gevalt”* or *un gevalt*, with the meaning “campaign meant to shock or alarm”¹⁸. This new type of an electoral campaign is deplored by society and the phrase has a clearly negative connotation. Through recategorization from noun into adjective, the German noun *gevalt* has come full circle and found its lost political meaning of power and control in the Hebrew language, and from there, in English and French¹⁹.

2.2) *Penal, penali*

It happens that, through the porosity of languages for specific purposes, and due to the fact that the legal language is one of the oldest specialized languages, a legal term could migrate from one field of activity to another, or just receive connotations from another domain: “Use of legal language is notable for the fact that it is very widespread: it governs all areas of social life, and it can, through intertextuality, be combined with language from any and every domain.” (Mattila, 2006: 4)

For the last three years, the Romanian oral legal jargon, as well as the political and journalistic languages have been toying with the recategorization of the adjective *penal*, of French (*pénal*) and Latin (*poenalis*) origin, into a noun *un penal*, *niște penali*, with the meaning “a criminal, some criminals”. The nominalization of an adjective in order to express the intensification of a negative emotion is a common phenomenon in informal Romanian (*bizar*, *un bizar*, *niște bizari*, a bizarre man, some bizarre men, *frumos*, *un frumos*, *niște frumoși*, beautiful, a beautiful man, some beautiful men etc.), but absent when it comes to the formal, official usage. The frontier between formal and informal usages has been crossed before in Romanian, with entry of the slang nouns *șpagă* and *parandărăt* meaning “bribe” in the formal language used by politicians, legal professionals, journalists, the large public (Veleanu, 2016: 230).

The meaning of this adjective is “related to crimes”, as it is found in phrases such as *drept penal*, penal law, *cod penal*, criminal code, *proces penal*, criminal trial, *fapt penal*, criminal act, *sanțiune penală*, criminal sentence, *clauză penală*, penalty clause²⁰. The newly created noun has yet to become a legal term and concept.

¹⁶ “Netanyahu's gevalt campaign is very effective”, JOFFRE, Tzvi, “Bennet: The situation is like this: it’s not good”, Jerusalem Post, April 9, 2019, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Bennett-The-situation-is-like-this-its-not-good-586274>

¹⁷ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/oy%20gevalt>

¹⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/08/netanyahu-rallies-right-wing-in-jerusalem-ahead-of-election>

¹⁹ https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/04/08/israel-une-campagne-electorale-inexistante-et-des-menaces-fantomes_1720169, <https://fr.timesofisrael.com/le-blitz-mediatique-de-netanyahu-est-une-campagne-catastrophe-cette-fois-ci/>

²⁰ <https://dexonline.ro/definitie/penal>

The new meaning is surprising, recalling the effect of a luxury neologism, as the adjective and noun *criminal* already exist in legal Romanian, coming from the French *criminel* and Latin *criminalis*, with the meaning “intending to kill, guilty of murder”. It is worth noticing that, in Old Romanian and under German influences, (from *Kriminal (gericht)*), the term acquired the meaning “tribunal, prison, imprisonment, prison facility for minors”²¹. Interestingly enough, the recategorization started in today’s political language, being first used by the Romanian president of German origins and German mother tongue, in order to aggressively point the finger at his political adversaries who were accused and/or found guilty of having infringed the law under an anti-corruption campaign which was deemed by others to exhibit a strong resemblance with the political police. The linguist may presume that a person’s mother tongue could influence one’s linguistic intentional and non-intentional creations. At the beginning of this phenomenon, one may have even categorized it as a hapax, but the newly substantivized adjective has been used relentlessly by its author as well as by journalists, politicians, legal professionals and the large public. Even more surprising is the homophonic and homographic resemblance between the Romanian adjective *penal* and the Germanic noun *Pennal* (from the Latin *penna*, “feather”), the latter having a current meaning in English and Swedish that has nothing to do with the legal or political fields (“pencil box”) but also a dated meaning as “a beginning student, a freshman in a German university, subject to hazing rituals” that involve aggressiveness, humiliation, harassment, abuse, and have been known to exist both in universities and in the army. The Romanian president was fined in May 2018 by the National Council Against Discrimination for having used the plural term *penali* in a discriminatory way (May 2017)²², which has not prevented him or other politicians, journalists, or legal professionals from using this formulaic term (Joyeux, Gautier, 2017) profusely in the political arena: *Fără penali în funcții publice*, translating as “without criminals in public offices” has become the electoral slogan of a newly created political party²³, while *Penalii PSD*, translating as “the criminals from PSD”, has been used to address politicians from the rival party. The neologism is felt as injurious in the Romanian society, being legally void while aiming to create and manipulate emotion, as well as a false impression of being a legal term which imposes a legal verdict on those who are designated by it. The examination of this phenomenon from the standing point of affective jurilinguistics shows how a legal adjective was hijacked by politicians who turned it into a political weapon that creates confusion and brings insulting aggressivity into the political debate, while the ordinary language became richer with one more word thanks to an official²⁴.

2.3) *Recomposition, human composting*

A semantic novelty that has recently become a legal term is the phrase “human compost”, anchored in the fashionable ecological tendency that has taken over the State of Washington for the last years. The unexpected mix of the [+person, +human, +living] adjective “human” and the *-ing* verbally derived noun “composting” bearing the semantic characteristics [-human, - person, -living] is crossing the frontier of the legal American world, being used by the non-initiated (journalists, politicians, etc.) to speak about a new form of funerary practice named “recomposition” as an alternative to burial or cremation of human remains in a bill brought before the Washington State Legislature in January 2019: “A bill before the

²¹ <https://dexonline.ro/definitie/criminal>

²² <https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-22438137-klaus-iohannis-fost-amendat-cncd-pentru-folosirea-cuvntului-penali.htm>

²³ <https://www.cotidianul.ro/demagogia-in-forma-pura-fara-penali-in-functii-publice/>

²⁴ “What are the principles of language change? Legal linguists can shed new light on this question. At the same time, they can examine how the language of judges and officials influences the development of ordinary language or the domain of use of different languages in society.” (Mattila, 2006: 19)

Washington State Legislature would make this state the first in the nation — and probably the world, legal experts said - to explicitly allow human remains to be disposed of and reduced to soil through composting, or what the bill calls recomposition.”²⁵ On May 21st 2019, Governor Jay Inslee signed the bill legalizing human composting, which will go into effect in May 2020²⁶. The practice was known by the laymen before being turned in to a law: “The process of recomposition provides a third option that speeds up the process of turning dead bodies into soil, a practice colloquially known as “human composting.” The bill describes the process as a “contained, accelerated conversion of human remains to soil.”” (*idem*) The inventors of the technique as well as of the terms are not legal professionals but business people animated by environmental concerns: “The driving force behind the movement in Washington state is Katrina Spade²⁷ and her company, Recompose. It says it can turn you into useable, fertile, soil in 30 days.”²⁸ The notion of *green funerals* thus sees the light of day while one of its forms is given legal status, thus creating a precedent for other common law countries. As far as Romano-Germanic legal systems are concerned, the implantation of “recomposition” as a legal term and a legal concept has yet to be seen. Translated into French as *humusation* and forbidden by law, this new funerary practice which supposes returning the recomposed human remains to the deceased’s family, to be used as compost in the family garden, for instance, is far from meeting a majority agreement, as not everyone is ready to eat tomatoes and cucumbers impregnated with, let’s say, one’s grandma’s flesh and bones. Will *human composting* become a legal term, too? Will *humusation* be accepted one day in France, as a legal term and as a practice exiting in a legal framework? These questions will find their answers in time, through the evolution of societies and their representation of reality, under the influence of their natural and cultural environments. Linguistically, it is interesting to notice that, in this case, the need for the simplification of legal language led to the clarification of the ambiguous legal noun *recomposition* (to compose again, to restore to composure²⁹) through the semantically surprising nominal structure *human composting*, which associates the positive perception of the *-ing* form *composting* as designating an environmentally-friendly technique of recycling organic materials later to be used for fertilizing and conditioning land³⁰, to the adjective *human* as in “of, relating to, or characteristic of humans, consisting of humans, having human form or attributes, representative of or susceptible to the sympathies and frailties of human nature”³¹.

One of the roles of the plain legal and administrative language, meant to ensure access to justice to all people and enshrined in the USA, among others, by the *Plain Writing Act of 2010*³², seems now to be that of a whistleblower, as it explains an opaque legal concept in a layman’s words and through references from everyday life.

As far as emotions go, using a human being’s body lucratively, be it under the form of their earthly remains, is still perceived as repugnant, sinful, or unethical by a part of our society, especially in Europe where the memory of the medical experiments perpetrated by the Nazis on the Jewish prisoners in the extermination camps is still vivid. Organ donation has gained

²⁵<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/death-human-compost.html>,

<https://app.leg.wa.gov/bills/summary?BillNumber=5001&Year=2019&Initiative=false>

²⁶ <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/22/us/washington-human-composting-legal-trnd/index.html>

²⁷ SPADE, Katrina, “Let’s talk about human composting”, TEDxOrcasIsland, 16 juin 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRsopS7yTG8>

²⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47031816>

²⁹ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recomposition>

³⁰ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/compost>

³¹ <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/human>

³² “An act to enhance citizen access to Government information and services by establishing that Government documents issued to the public must be written clearly, and for other purposes.” *Plain Writing Act of 2010*, <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-111publ274>

more public approval in spite of religious and ethical reserves (Joralemon, 2001) that have also turned around the question of *compensation plans* (in plain English: the financial retribution of the donors), as in a hearings before a US Congressional committee headed by Albert Gore Jr. in 1983: “ Bioethicists ... also spoke against financial arrangements for organs. While some of these witnesses indicated their disapproval in mild terms, others chose strong words to communicate their views: “immoral”, “abhorrent”, “appalled”, “morally repugnant and reprehensible”, “offensive”, “morally and ethically irresponsible”.” (Joralemon, 2001: 30) Even persons in dire need for a transplant were against such a practice: “Mary Ann Engebretsen, who came to the hearings with a daughter in critical need of a liver transplant, put her objection in simple, but eloquent terms: “I just feel that this offends my sense of right and wrong... . God has given you only one body and you should not sell those parts simply because it is yours... . I just feel it is wrong” (*idem*). For other minority groups a blood transfusion is still perceived as an offense to religious and moral law and sometimes an emergency court order may be needed in order to save a human life³³.

III. Conclusion

While trying to make sense of the world by investigating, interpreting and organizing information, as well as mastering our emotions and regulating those of others, we encounter one of the points of interest that affective jurilinguistics deals with, which is lexical potentiality, or the possibility for a word to become a legal term and for a legal term to fade into the general language or migrate to another field of specialization, becoming “un terme à double appartenance”, a term that belongs to two fields (Cornu, 2005: 68). Linguistically, one could not foresee that the adjective *penal* would someday, under foreign influence, be metamorphosed into a noun, or that the noun *gevalt* would be used in political Hebrew, or that *recomposition*, generally defined as “the action of composing or forming something again or differently”³⁴ would become a specialized term in the American funerary law. Extralinguistically, one can speculate on the “ifs” and “whens” of the extinction of these terms by taking into account factors such as an ideal disappearance of or decrease in populism and demagoguery on the political scene or a radical shift in mentalities concerning the treatment reserved to the deceased that would allow for the translation of the term and of the practice into other legal language-cultures. Writing about the *charge potentielle*, the “potential valence”, of a term, Gérard Cornu observed:

« Plus radicalement, il convient de mettre en relief le concept de potentialité lexicale. Qu’en pragmatique, un mot revête le sens que produisent, dans la circonstance, les agents du discours, n’exclut pas et postule au contraire qu’en dehors même des effets spontanés de valeur (des inventions langagières sur le vif) un terme possède, *in intellectu*, en amont de son emploi décisif *in actu*, une charge potentielle : un ou même plusieurs sens potentiels (la polysémie est une richesse lexicale en puissance). » (Cornu, 59: 2005)

The relation between polysemy and emotion becomes apparent when observing the phenomenon of semantic neology through the example of a term such as the French *collaborateur* which acquired a new meaning during the Second World War, adding to the semantic characteristic of [+working together] those of [+death, +fear, +treason, +working with and helping the Nazis]:

« Ce mot, pour des survivants de la persécution des Juifs, était chargé d’un sens venu de leur histoire. En temps de paix, le mot « collaborateur » aurait simplement signifié qu’on allait travailler ensemble. Mais pour ceux qui avaient connu la guerre et la délation, il avait une odeur de mort qui le rendait difficile à prononcer. » (Cyrulnik, 2019: 11)

³³ <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/sep/11/the-children-act-ian-mcewan-review-novel>

³⁴ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/recomposition>

During the same historical period another term became polysemic under the Nazis: the noun *Konzentrationslager* had started out in German as an exotic military and wartime term designating the camps where Boer prisoners were kept by the English and was destined to a brief existence to be related exclusively to a specific colonial war, being geographically and chronologically circumscribed. But during the Third Reich the neologism of foreign origin reappeared only to name a German institution during peace time, as Victor Klemperer described it in its analysis of the language of Nazi Germany, *LTI Lingua Tertio Imperii*:

« A présent, soudain resurgi, il désigne une institution allemande, un dispositif de paix qui se dresse sur le sol européen contre des Allemands, un dispositif durable et non une mesure provisoire prise en temps de guerre contre l'ennemi. Je crois qu'à l'avenir, où que l'on prononce le mot « camp de concentration », on pensera à l'Allemagne hitlérienne et seulement à l'Allemagne hitlérienne... » (Klemperer, 1996 : 65-66)

Noumikos and *pathos* are intertwined, and the seemingly unemotional approach of those who make and enforce the laws (“What the lawyer does - what the lawyer has been trained to do and has expertise in doing - is to sort the facts of that human problem or situation into a series of legal categories: claims, defenses, procedures, and evidentiary proof”, Kruse, 2011: 584) is the complement of the mere *raison d'être* of justice, according to E. Levinas:

« Être responsable pour le prochain, être gardien d'autrui – contrairement à la vision caïnésque du monde -, définit la fraternité. C'est au tribunal, qui raisonne et qui pèse, que l'amour du prochain serait possible. Outrance dont le sens est visible : aucune indulgence n'est gratuite. Elle est toujours payée par quelque innocent à son insu. Elle n'est permise au juge que si, personnellement, il en assume les frais. Mais il appartient au juge terrestre, à l'homme, au frère du coupable, de restituer le prochain à la fraternité humaine. » (Levinas, 2005: 20).

The fraternity of which Levinas spoke was that which originated from the Jewish Torah and later inspired Christianity, in times when the laws of nature were perceived as divine laws and when the human beings designed the laws governing their living together in accordance with the natural laws and with the expressed aim of pleasing God. Man's role once asserted and his freedom gained from under dogmatic tyranny either by Prometheus in the Greek civilization or by the *libre arbitre* posed by the Jewish Law, the concept of fraternity changed its signification and with it, the meaning of justice. But the Western society forgot the importance of emotions and invented a pyramidal, accusatory legal system based on alterity and not on multiplicity, on syllogisms and not on a holistic comprehension of the individual and of the group he belongs to, which would have included close attention paid to the role of emotions and not simply barring them from the public place, ignoring the advice of the Oracle of Delphi: “the most beautiful is the most just”.

In the Central and Western Europe, as well as in most common law countries, emotions receive an ambivalent treatment, as they constitute the foundation of branches of the law (“Toute la justice criminelle, puisqu'elle est à bas de jurys populaires, est fondée sur un postulat émotionnel”, M^e François Saint-Pierre quoted in Haag, 2019: 307), permeating as such various sub-genres of the legal language, and are, at the same time, banned from the process of rendering justice, as our desire of vengeance is silenced and resolved by entrusting the necessity of punishment in the name of society to judges and laws:

“Le désir de vengeance est un moteur naturel, logique, historiquement ancré dans les fondements de bon nombre de sociétés primitives (par exemple : la loi du talion du code d'Hammurabi, à Babylone en 1730 av. J.-C.). Nous avons refoulé cet instinct en confiant aux juges et aux différents codes et réglementations le soin de proportionner la réponse sociale, de punir au nom de la société (et d'ainsi éviter les interminables vendettas en factions ou familles), mais cet élan est resté ancré au plus profond de notre psychisme, prêt à trouver l'occasion de s'exprimer violemment. » (Haag, 2019: 299)

Emotions are present in the courtroom either as a result of rhetorical means used by lawyers or as remnants of a comprehensive attitude which considers *heat of passion* as a mitigating circumstance in an act of violence. Emotions play a role in the perpetration of a crime, as well as a crime triggers affective responses from those involved in its regulation which contaminate the entire judicial physical and psychological environment. The French *cour d'assises*³⁵, created by Napoleon Bonaparte and inspired from the English *Courts of Assize* whose name comes from the legal Old French *assise*, “legal action, session”, represents not only an example of the contact between legal French and legal English and their conjoined evolution, but also a specific part of the ritualization of justice that is filled with emotion and becomes a place of emotion-power (“un lieu d’émotion-pouvoir”, M^e Fabrice Epstein quoted in Haag, 2019: 324) as the *avocat general* Philippe Bilger explains:

“un lieu privilégié où il y a une singularité de l’atrocité, une singularité de la misère, une singularité de l’intelligence dévoyée, et des moments d’émotions paroxystiques qui font que l’atmosphère y est affectivement lourde. Les murs sont comme imprégnés de tout cela, d’états d’âme, de rebondissements, de suées froides, d’anxiétés, relatives à tout un tas d’affaires antérieures, comme un cuir bien tanné. » (Haag, 2019 : 306)

In Latin American countries, the importance of emotion is underlined by the code of conduct of the legal profession, as “the prosecutor should become carried away as his address proceeds, and his voice should rise in pitch. The impression is completed by body language, notably by using the eyes and the hands.” (Mattila, 2007: 39)

In the traditional legal systems such as the First Nations’ in Canada the expression of emotions lies at the chore of the legal process which is construed as a means to restore harmony within a social group that has been disturbed by an unlawful act. The process of judgement takes place in a “healing circle” where the members of the society, victims, perpetrators, their families and friends, sit down together³⁶ and express their feelings and thoughts about the crime that was committed by one of them. It is believed that the process of judgement is a healing process through which the negative emotions that are the origin of the offense can be publicly expressed and dealt with in a constructive manner, the sentence imposed by the group at the end of this process aiming exclusively at restoring balance both at an individual and collective level for all those involved and concerned. Taking the example of his own work experience with the First Nations, Judge John Reilly³⁷ explains that treatment-oriented sentences meant to address anger management, for instance, are more effective and beneficial to both offenders and society than imprisonment which most of the time only reinforces anger and aggressiveness.

This works as a reminder of another traditional perception of the act of justice belonging to the Judeo-Christian culture and which puts an emphasis on the importance of emotions in a social group: the *lifnei iver* (“before the blind”) or the “stumbling block” commandment: לִפְנֵי לֵאמֹר, “Before the blind, do not put a stumbling block” (Leviticus, 19-14). A prohibition against misleading people, this regulation concerns ethical behavior that goes beyond its literal meaning, addressing issues related to justice and physical, psychological and social vulnerability. In Jewish oral law the perlocutory effects of an act of communication are taken into account by prohibiting the facilitation of a reprehensible act to a person who would not have committed it otherwise. The *Shulchan Aruch* (“Set Table”), the Code of Jewish Law

³⁵ « La cour d’assises, dont le nom est instauré sous Napoléon, en 1810, est l’héritage du tribunal criminel, mis en place à la Révolution française, sur le modèle anglo-saxon. Pour en finir avec la justice arbitraire de l’Ancien Régime, les accusés y sont jugés par leurs concitoyens, aidés de magistrats. » https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2018/03/09/justice-pourquoi-reformer-les-assises_5268288_4355770.html

³⁶ « Nous nous asseyons en cercle sur le sol pour que personne ne soit plus élevé que les autres. » (Eberhard, 2010 : 84)

³⁷ Judge John Reilly *My Aboriginal Education*, TEDxCalgary, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq3a5CgBggE>

written by Joseph Karo in the 16th century, for instance, posed a *halakhic* (“legal”, literally “the way to walk”) principle which prevents a father from physically chastising his children, as this will only humiliate, anger and entice them to hit him back, which would be a capital offence (*Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah* 240:20³⁸). Violence triggers violence and one notices, through these examples from two different language-cultures, the importance of emotion management in a legal context.

This leads us to the conclusion that emotions should be given the attention they deserve as engines of our every single action building up to the dynamics of a whole society; that society, envisaged as our capacity and will to live together, should be considered as the starting point and target of any legal system which is both a social product and a producer of sociality (Le Roy, 1999: 178-179); and that the construction, evolution and enforcement of legal systems and norms should be accompanied by an awareness of their affective triggers. S. Thompson and P. Hoggett emphasized “the affective turn in contemporary political studies”, remarking that “it seems odd that, whilst acceptance of the role of the emotions in public and political life was once commonplace, it is only now being rediscovered after decades of neglect.” (Thomson, Hoggett 2012: 11). We cannot but advocate for an affective turn in legal and jurilinguistic studies especially in today’s reticular, multicultural, plurilingual, “post-truth”³⁹ world of “alternative facts”:

“When determining how best to proceed, reformers need to adopt a robust interdisciplinary approach to ensure the development of a process that is capable of addressing psychological, neurological, and social factors driving the alternative fact phenomenon. In so doing, the legal community should not only take account of data from a wide range of disciplines, including those that may have been overlooked in the past, it should also coordinate research agendas and findings with other sectors of civil society seeking to improve the quality of contemporary political discourse. Only through this type of well-researched response can the legal community overcome the political, legal, and communicative challenges of a post-truth society and navigate the brave new world in which we all find ourselves.” (Strong, 2017: 145-146)

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³⁸ https://www.sefaria.org/Shulchan_Arukh%2C_Yoreh_De'ah.240?lang=bi

³⁹ WANG, Amy B., ““Post-Truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries”, Washington Post, November 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/?utm_term=.12aaa7361b38

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